

or because for one reason or another its
ardour was
no longer equal to the continued strain
upon its
courage. This point is put with
great
Break-through force by Falkenhayn in
discussing this very
WidSS Problem in reference to the German
attacks
on the Russian Front:—

" The attack in Galicia was not
undertaken until
the Germans felt certain that they
were opposed
by troops whose morale was absolutely
rotted by
a merciless campaign. In truth, this is
the chief
factor in the solution of the problem so
often
discussed during the War, whether
attempts to
break through with the object of forcing
a decision
constituted a wise policy or not.
Against an
enemy in good military and moral
condition they
were certainly not to be recommended.
Accordingly,
in the whole course of the War, breaks
through only
succeeded where this condition was not
present.³⁵

Generals on both sides accepted this
axiom, but
they hardly ever gave it an honest
application.
When they were anxious to launch an
offensive in a
particular sector, they always attached
undue importance to reports of
Biased use of information in the
deterioration of morale of the enemy on
that front. A
by Army mass of conflicting gossip and
rumours
Intelligence came to the *Intelligence* Branch
from
every quarter, often from prisoners trying

to deceive
or anxious to please. When it was sifted
and weighed,
human nature being what it is, a bias
developed in
the direction of the reports that supported
the thesis
known to have been already formed by the
High
Command. The subordinate who declines
to sacrifice
judgment to a mistaken conception of
loyalty is
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